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ABSTRACT 
 
In an infinitely repeated intraindustry trade game governments improve on the static prisoners 
dilemma outcome of the Brander and Spencer (1985) trade policy.  When firms collude as joint 
monopolist governments’ reach the Pareto frontier of their feasible and individually rational set 
(FIRS) using a policy of free trade.  Free trade and collusion will place firms on the Pareto 
frontier of their effective feasible and individually rational set (EFIRS).  Without collusion free 
trade forces governments and firms inside their respective FIRS and EFIRS.  We demonstrate that 
without collusion governments return to the Pareto frontier of their FIRS only when taxing 
exports. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ountries that participated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) spent years 
negotiating multilateral tariff reductions and export subsidy elimination.  As GATT evolved into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) the agenda items, tariff reduction and export subsidy elimination, 
did not change.  That these policy items have remained so prominent through time is not coincidental, since nearly 
two-hundred years of economic analysis has shown that in most circumstances free trade will be welfare improving.  
One exception to the free trade rule are goods that trade in an intraindustry setting, as defined by Brander and 
Spencer (1985) [henceforth B&S]. 
 
 While B&S were not the first to notice the model intraindustry trade patterns, their model has become the 
workhorse of the intraindustry trade literature.  An important conclusion of B&S’s analysis is that free trade is not 
an equilibrium outcome.  However, as shown by Collie (1993), for example, once the static model of B&S is cast 
into the dynamic setting of an infinitely repeated game free trade can be restored to its equilibrium status.  We show 
that active policy, in the form of an export tax, will lead to Pareto improvements relative to free trade.  Moreover, 
we also prove that an export tax is the only policy that leads to a Pareto improvement relative to free trade. 
 
 A variation of the B&S trade model serves as the stage game in our infinitely repeated trade setting.  We 
demonstrate that free trade will increase the value taken by the social benefit function, relative to an infinite 
repetition of the static B&S equilibrium, in two separate circumstances.  First, when firms are allowed to collude 
free trade will place governments on the Pareto frontier of the Feasible and Individually Rational Set (FIRS).  
Second, if firms are not able to collude free trade will still increase the value taken by the social benefit function, 
even though governments will be inside their FIRS.  Consequently, a Pareto improvement is possible.  We 
demonstrate that only an export tax will lead to a Pareto improvement relative to free trade for the governments in 
the absence of firm collusion.  Thus, free trade and an export tax both Pareto dominate an infinite repetition of 
B&S’s static export subsidy. 
 
 Our dynamic setting is similar to the model constructed by Collie (1993).  Using this model we 
demonstrate that free trade is a subgame perfect outcome in the infinitely repeated setting.  This result is not new 
since Collie (1993) also reached this conclusion.  However, we extend Collie (1993) by proving that an export tax 
will generate a Pareto improvement for governments relative to free trade, in the absence of collusion.  Collie (1993) 
alludes to this fact; however, no proof is offered in his writing. 
C 
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 The present work is similar to Fung (1991), and Lommerud and Sorgard (2001) in only one respect.  Like 
these authors we use a variation of the B&S’s model as a stage game in an infinitely repeated game of intraindustry 
trade.  These authors analyze the impact of collusion, which is viable in an infinitely repeated game, on the firms’ 
trade relation.  We analyze a very different problem.  We assume that international relations prohibit collusion 
between firms.  This prohibition restricts firms, in our setting, to Cournot behavior.  Cournot competition and the 
absence of collusion will place governments in the interior of their FIRS.  Governments move toward the Pareto 
frontier only if they collude in trade policy.  The collusion by governments will generate a Pareto improvement 
relative to free trade. 
 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In section two the model is developed.  In section three we present the 
main results of this paper.  In section four we extend the results of section three to a more robust setting.  In section 
four we offer conclusions. 
 
MODEL 
 
The model is a variation of the B&S model.  There are four players, two governments and two firms, that 
we model is an extensive form game.  Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} represent this set of players, where player 1 is the 
domestic governments, and player 3 is a domestic firm.  Similarly, player 2 is a foreign government, and player 4 is 
a foreign firm. 
 
 In this extensive form game governments move first.  Governments will choose a trade policy, either an 
export subsidy or an export tax.  Once trade policy is in place firms compete in output in a common third market, 
with no sale or consumption of their output in either producing country. 
 
 Let 
 
p(x3 + x4) = a – b(x3 + x4) (1) 
 
represent the inverse demand for the firms’ output in the third country.  Throughout this paper a subscript refers to 
the action choice player i   N ; thus, in (1) xi  refers to an output choice made by firm i.  Given (1) define each 
firm’s action space as the compact interval Si = [0,a/b], for  
 
i = 3,4.  With demand defined 
 
gj = (p(x3 + x4) – c + sj-2)xj,  (2) 
 
for j = 3, 4, represents the payoff function of firm j.  In (2) sj-2  represents an export subsidy/tax offered to firm j by 
their respective government.  The parameter c < a is the constant cost per unit, which is identical for both firms.  
Thus, the entire expression represents the profit earned by each firm. 
  
Governments will choose an export subsidy, si   0, or tax, si   0.  Each government will choose a trade 
policy from the compact interval Si = [-(a - c)/2, (a – c)}, for i = 1, 2.
1
 Because good x is consumed in a third 
country each government’s social benefit function,  
 
gi = gi  + 2 – sixi + 2, (3) 
 
is the sum of the respective domestic firm’s profit and the revenues collected or spent on trade policy. 
 
                                                 
1 This interval was constructed and justified in Author.  A description of how this interval was chosen is also found in Section 4.  
The compactness of each player’s action set is required.  This assumption allows us to use existing Folk Theorem to define 
subgame-perfect equilibria. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2007 Volume 6, Number 11 
 3 
 The game that has been described is a static extensive form game with a unique solution.  The static Nash 
equilibrium is 
 
s
NE
 = 
2 2
 ,  ,  ,  ,
5 5 5b 5b
    
 
 
 (4) 
 
where γ = a – c.  Using this strategy each player receives 
 
g(s
NE
) =
2 2 2 22 2 4 4
 ,  ,  , 
25 25b 25b 25bb
    
 
 
 (5) 
 
in payoff. 
 
 We now construct an infinitely repeated version of the static model described above.  The above model will 
serve as a stage game for our infinitely repeated game.  It should be noted that this stage game has two steps, where 
we use the term step as defined by Wen (2002). 
 
 The average discounted sum 
 
vi = (1 – δ) 
 = 0
t
t


  gi (a(t))   (6) 
 
describes each player payoff in the infinitely repeated game.  The parameter 0 ≤ δ < 1 represents each players 
discount factor.  The discount factor measures a player’s patients, or time cost.  Note that the average discounted 
sum is the same functional form used in the proof of Friedman’s (1971) and Fudenberg and Maskin’s (1986) Folk 
theorems.  Consequently, the implications of this functional form can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) for 
example. 
 
 Folk theorems are used to classify the set of subgame perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game.  The 
proofs of these theorems are constructive; thus, the proofs describe how to construct the subgame perfect equilibria.  
Friedman’s (1971) theorem is used to construct subgame perfect equilibria that strictly Pareto dominate an infinite 
repetition of the static Nash equilibrium.  Fudenberg and Maskin’s (1986) folk theorem demonstrates that for a 
sufficiently large δ any payoff in the FIRS is subgame perfect. 
 
 Either folk theorem could be used is sections 3 and 4, since we are not concerned with the actual 
construction of subgame perfect equilibria.  We are instead concerned with a set of potential equilibria and the 
properties of that set.  However, the folk theorems of Friedman (1971) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) do 
guarantee that the set that we analyze will be subgame perfect for some value of δ. 
 
 The structure of this game can be fully analyzed using the payoff functions gi, this is so because the payoffs 
in the infinitely repeated game are defined as the average discounted sum of the per period payoffs.  Let S = xiN Si 
describe all possible strategy combinations in the static game.  This set is used to define the FIRS for this set of 
players.  Another interesting set is X (s1 , s2) = x i { 3, 4 } Si, which describes all possible output combinations as a 
functions of stage one trade policy.  The set X (s1, s2) is used when describing the effective feasible and individually 
rational set (EFIRS) for stage two players.  Define the FIRS as 
 
V = {v|vi (s) > v i for all s   S}, (7) 
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where v i is player i’s minmax value.  For the governments this set is easily defined and describes the set of all 
possible subgame perfect equilibria.  For the firms V is a well defined non-empty set.  However, once governments 
have made a policy choice there are many elements of V that are no longer available for firms.  Consequently, for 
the firms we define 
 
V f (s1, s2) = {vi(s1, s2)   V| there exists x3, and x4 such that  (8) 
 
g3 (s1, s2,x3, x4) = v3 and g4 (s1, s2, x3, x4) = v4},  (9) 
 
where (x3, x4)   X (s1, s1), to be the EFIRS.  When using Friedman’s argument to construct a subgame perfect 
equilibrium a feasible payoff must come from this set.  Otherwise step two players may wish to deviate from agreed 
upon play.
2
 
 
 Below we restrict firms to the passive behavior of always choosing their Cournot equilibrium given trade 
policy.  This assumption will make the choice between Friedman’s (1971) or Fudenberg and Maskin’s (1986) 
irrelevant, when we are constructing subgame perfect strategies. 
 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
To simplify the dynamic game assume that firms are not allowed, perhaps by law, to collude, and that this 
prohibition can be enforced.  This will make the firms a passive player in our game, they will take trade policy as 
given and choose their optimal output as Cournot oligopolists.  Given this circumstance governments; will use trade 
policy to manipulate their social benefit. 
 
 For governments define the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs in the usual way.  Let 
 
Vg = {v| there exists some s   S = S1 x S2 such that v = g(s)}  (10) 
 
represent that set of individually rational payoffs.  Then the FIRS is defined by 
 
V g = {v   Vg | vi > iv  for all i}, (11) 
 
where iv  is player i’s minmax value, which is zero for both governments.  
 
 Passive firms will always choose their Nash equilibrium output level given trade policy, defined as  
x3 = 
1 2 + 2s  s
3b
 
 (12) 
 
x4 = 
2  1 + 2s  s
3b
 
 (13) 
 
Substitution of (12) and (13) into (3) defines each government’s payoff function as a function of trade policy only.   
 
These functions 
*
1g  = 
  1 2 1 2 - s - s  + 2s - s
9b
 
 (14) 
                                                 
2 It was demonstrated by author that free trade cannot be established as a subgame perfect equilibrium 
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*
2g = 
  1 2 2 1 - s  - s  - 2s
9
s
b
  
 (15) 
describe each government’s stage game payoff, given firms are choosing their Nash equilibrium output levels.  
Given (14) and (15), and the fact that Si = [-γ /2, γ], we find that the 
 
gi
M
 = arg 
,{ }
max
i js s
 gi = 
2
4b

 , 
 
If firms are able they would always deviate from a free trade choice of policy, if the punishment strategy is 
Friedman’s which defines each governments maximum payoff, and  
 
v i = 
is
min  max
js
 = 0 
 
for i = 1, 2.  These points are defined in Figure 1.  The outer bound of the governments FIRS is a linear combination 
of g1
M
 and g2
M
. 
 
 Point B,     2 22 / 25 ,2 / 25b b  in Figure 1 represents the payoff each government would receive 
for an infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium.  Since point B is on the interior of the FIRS it is immediately 
obvious that a Pareto improvement could be made for both governments.  Any Pareto improvement should be 
welcomed since the point B payoff represents a prisoners dilemma outcome for governments. 
 
 Previous work on the infinite repetition of a B&S type game focuses on free trade when constructing a 
subgame perfect equilibrium.  Free trade is a natural target, or a natural focal point, and, as mentioned in the 
introduction, the policy of choice of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Point A, (γ2/(9b), γ2/(9b)), in Figure 1 
represents the free trade payoff combination for the governments.  Obviously, free trade increases social benefit 
relative to an infinite repetition of the static equilibrium, and eliminates the prisoners dilemma outcome.  Just as 
obvious in Figure 1 is that social benefit could increase relative to the payoff combination of point A.  Consequently 
a Pareto improvement is possible.
3
 
 
                                                 
3 This seems an appropriate place to state that governments would be on the Pareto frontier of their FIRS with free trade if firms 
were allowed to collude.  However, if firms are not allowed to collude the governments will never reach their Pareto frontier 
without the use of trade policy.  Thus, social benefit can increase regardless of what is happening to firms.  
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 One possible Pareto improvement would be a strategy that leaves player 1 receiving the free trade payoff, 
but increases player 2’s payoff relative to free trade.  One such Pareto improvement is defined at point D in Figure 1.  
While this point seems arbitrary it will initiate a question regarding policy that we will answer in Proposition 3.  We 
summarize this particular equilibrium in 
 
Proposition 1  Given the passive behavior of firms the subsidy choice 
 
s = 
5 2
- ,  -
18 9
 
 
 
 
 (16) 
 
for governments is a Pareto improvement relative to the strategy s
ft
 = (0, 0). 
 
Proof.  Substitution of s into (14) and (15) results in  
 
g1(s) = 
2
9b

 (17) 
 
g2(s) = 
25
36b

. (18) 
 
Equation (17) is the free trade equilibrium payoff.  The boundary of the FIRS is defined by 
 
v2 = -v1 + 
2
4b

. (19) 
 
 
Substitution of v1 = g1 (s) into (19) defines v2 = g2 (s), which is greater than the free trade payoff.  Together (17) and 
(18) define point D in Figure 1.  No player is worse off given these payoffs and the foreign government is strictly 
better off using this strategy.  Consequently (17) and (18) define a Pareto improvement. 
 
 The policy choice used in Proposition 1 defines a Pareto improvement relative to free trade.  At the same 
time it identifies two interesting points.  First, while this outcome is a Pareto improvement, relative to free trade, it is 
not equitable.  The domestic government may be disturbed at the fact that the foreign government is receiving a 
strictly greater payoff than is the domestic government.  The second observation is perhaps more interesting.  For 
this Pareto improvement governments must both use an export tax. 
 
 Equity seems to be an issue in trade policy.  This is evident in arguments request that firms have an equal 
playing field in trade.  The issue of equity is easily analyzed using the present form of our trade model.  To define an 
equitable Pareto improvement we require that  
 
s1 = s2, which will result in v1 = v2. 
     
Proposition 2  Suppose that firms are passive and that s  = s1 = s2.  Any strategy s
1
   [-γ/2, 0] will lead to a 
Pareto improvement for the governments relative to the free trade outcome. 
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Proof.  The proof amounts to finding a solution in s to 
 
( s  + γ) (γ - 2 s ) – γ2 ≥ 0,  (20) 
 
which reduced to  
 
- s (2 s + γ) ≥ 0. (21) 
 
The solution to (21) is s   [-γ/2, 0], which completes the proof. 
 
 Using the strategy s  = / 4  each government’s social benefit would reach 2 = /(8 )iv b .  This 
payoff is on the Pareto frontier, point C in Figure 1, and is the same payoff that governments would receive with free 
trade and firms producing and splitting the joint monopoly output level and profits. 
 
 Why should an export tax be preferred to free trade with collusion?  Obviously foreign consumers are 
paying the same price in either case.  So it is not a question of income distribution in the export market.  It is, 
however, an issue of income distribution in each of the producing countries.  With an export tax income is being 
redistributed from each producer to their respective government.  Thus, the export market provides a source of 
revenue to each government.  With free trade and collusion governments lose this source of revenue, which is 
transferred to the producers. 
 
 Proposition 2 defines all of the equitable Pareto improvement, relative to free trade, for the governments.  
Any s   [-γ/2, 0] generates a payoff along the line connecting points B and C in Figure 1.  Furthermore, the 
symmetric strategy of Proposition 2 suggests that the tax used to reach the Pareto frontier is roughly the same 
magnitude, 1/4γ instead of 1/5γ, as the subsidy used in the static equilibrium. 
 
 As in Proposition 1 Proposition 2 states that any equitable Pareto improvement requires an export tax.  In 
general suppose that firms are not allowed to collude.  What policy combinations would create a Pareto 
improvement, relative to free trade, for the governments?  The answer to this question lies in the simultaneous 
solution of 
 
   21 2 2 12
 -   0
9b 9b
s s s s     
  (22) 
 
And 
 
   21 2 1 22
 -   0
9b 9b
s s s s     
  (23) 
 
Proposition 3  The only simultaneous solutions to (22) and (23) are for s1 and s2 which are both non-positive. 
 
Proof.  First consider only (22); actually we ignore the 9b’s in the denominators since they have no affect on the 
solution set.  Multiplying out the left side, setting it equal to zero and solving for s2 we get 
 
2 2
1 1
2
2    4   9
 = 
2
s s
s
   
    (24) 
 
So there are two components to the solution set, one at and above the “plus” curve and one at and below the 
“minus” curve, as in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Curves with γ=14 
 
 
Claim 1:  All of the solutions in the upper component have 2  s  , so we exclude these, recall that 
  [- /2, ]iS   , for governments. 
 
 For a solution in the upper component we have 
 
2 2
1 1 1
2 
2   4   9 2     2
     2
2 2
s s s
s
   

    
    (25) 
 
Claim 2:  All of the solutions in the lower component are below the line 2 1 = s / 2s . 
 
 To see this we just check that 
 
2 2
1 1 1 1
2
2   4   9 2  2
     .
2 2 2
s s s s
s
       
     (26) 
 
We use this second claim to finish.  We first note that the solution set to (23) is exactly the solution set to 
(22) reflected over the line s1 = s2 , i.e.  (a, b) is a solution to (23) if and only if  (b, a) is a solution to (22).  From 
this it follows that the only solutions to (23) are above the line s2 = 2s1, and so the only possible simultaneous 
solutions are in the third quadrant with s1 and s2 both non-positive. 
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Figure 3: Solution set to (22) and (23) with γ=14. 
 
 
Proposition 3 demonstrates that a Pareto improvement for governments, relative to free trade, requires an 
export tax. 
  
Switching from a static to a dynamic model of intraindustry trade moved governments out of the prisoners 
dilemma found in the static game.  Elimination of the prisoners dilemma only requires that governments use free 
trade policy.  However, when firms are unable to collude, we have shown that collusion between governments will 
increase their payoff even more, relative to free trade. 
 
 Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate how a dynamic game shifts the focus of trade policy away from 
producers, the static case, and places the focus of policy directly on the governments.  In the static case foreign 
consumers and domestic producers gain at the expense of domestic consumers and the domestic government.  With 
free trade and firm’s colluding domestic producers gain at the expense of foreign consumers, that are now paying the 
monopoly price.  With an export tax, and firms unable to collude, and if governments can collude each government 
will gain at the expense of foreign consumers and their respective domestic producer. 
 
 Tacit collusion by firms is certainly feasible, especially with price competition.  However, not allowing 
firms to collude is a reasonable supposition, especially with quantity competition.  Furthermore, in the United States 
and the rest of the industrialized world anti trust laws are used to prohibit explicit collusion by firms.  Without the 
ability to collude governments will receive a payoff inside of their FIRS.  To move toward the Pareto frontier of the 
governments FIRS active trade policy, in the form of an export tax, would definitely be feasible. 
 
ASYMMETRIC COSTS 
 
An interesting extension of Proposition 3 would be to analyze a similar trade game in which costs are 
asymmetric.  Costs may differ based on differences in technology in production.  However, given the industry 
structure large cost differentials may not be expected on technology grounds.  A very reasonable explanation for 
cost differences in our trade game would be geographic distance to market. 
 
 Suppose that the domestic firm has a constant cost per unit of c3 and the foreign firm has a constant cost per 
unit of c4.  Suppose that c3 ≠ c4.  We maintain the assumption that firms cannot collude, they simply choose a 
Cournot output level given trade policy.  Given these assumptions 
 
  2 3 1 4 3 4 1 2
1 1, 2
2 2 2
(  )  
9
a s c s c a c c s s
g s s
b
       
        (27) 
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  1 4 2 3 4 3 1 2
2 1, 2
a - s - 2c + 2s + c  a - 2c + c - s - s
(  s ) = 
9b
g s        (28) 
 
represents the payoff functions of the two governments. 
 
 With asymmetric costs we must reanalyze the bounds on S1 and S2.  These bounds are derived from 
analysis of the firms’ reaction functions.  We define 1 3 4 4 3 = [ ( 2 ) / 2,  2 ].S a c c a c c        If the foreign 
government were to choose free trade and the domestic government chose the lower bound of S1 the domestic firm 
would be completely pushed out of the export market.  Similarly, if the foreign government were to choose free 
trade and the domestic government were to choose the upper bound of S1 the foreign firm would be pushed 
completely out of the export market.  Similarly, 2 4 3 3 4[ ( 2 ) / 2, 2 ]S a c c a c c       represents a foreign 
governments strategy set. 
 
 Choosing S1 and S2 in this manner may seem arbitrary.  A more natural choice might be for consumers to 
place a bound on how much they are willing to pay out in subsidies.  If firms had a capacity constraint on output a 
cap may naturally occur as well.  While these natural constraints probably exist we maintain that our choice of 
boundary remains rich enough to give very reasonable outcomes. 
 
 If costs are different across firms, the outer boundary of the FIRS will shift, relative to previous analysis.  
However, the outer bound is still a linear combination of the maximum payoff of each government.  The maximum 
occurs when the government’s domestic firm produces as a monopolist.  This maximum will be lower for the high 
cost firm. 
 
Figure 4: FIRS with cost difference across firms 
 
 
 Even with the change in FIRS free trade will still be within the set of feasible and individually rational 
payoffs, see Figure 4.  Figure 4 represents the FIRS for two different cost combinations. In both cases we assume 
that c4 > c3.  Point A represents one free trade combination.  The two rays extending outward from point A are to 
illustrate that a Pareto improvement is possible, relative to free trade.  If c4 were to rise while c3 remained constant 
the free trade position would move to point B.  At point B player 1s payoff would increase relative to player 2s; 
however, a Pareto improvement is still possible relative to point B.  However, the free trade payoff 
 
 
2
3 41
2
(0,0)
9
a c c
g
b
 
  (29) 
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 
2
4 32
2
(0,0)
9
a c c
g
b
 
  (30) 
 
will no longer be symmetric, except in the special case of c3 = c4.  The low cost firm will produce more output and 
generate more profits, which will translate into a higher social benefit for the country with the low cost firm. 
 
 With asymmetric costs it is difficult to say what an equitable Pareto improvement would be.  However, 
both governments could still reach a Pareto improvement relative to the free trade payoff.  Finding this Pareto 
improvement amounts to finding a simultaneous solution to the inequalities 
 
    
2
4 3 1 2 4 3 1 2 4 32 2 2 2 0a c c s s a c c s s a c c           
 
 
and 
    
2
3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 42 2 2 2 0a c c s s a c c s s a c c             
 
for values s1 and s2 which satisfy  
 
4 3 1 3 4 3 4 2 4 3( 2 ) / 2 2  and ( 2 ) / 2 2a c c s a c c a c c s a c c              . 
 
 To simplify the algebra in the following we set 4 3 3 42  and 2u a c c v a c c      .  Rewriting the 
inequalities, we are interested in solutions to four inequalities. 
 
   21 2 1 22 0u x s u s s u       (31) 
 
   21 2 2 12 0v s s v s s v       (32) 
 
1/ 2u s v           (33) 
 
2/ 2v s u    (34) 
 
Proposition 4  The only solutions to equations (31) through (34) are for s1 and s2 which are both non-positive. 
 
Proof.  First we obtain a general description of the solution set for (31); a similar description holds for (32). 
 
 Multiplying out the left side of (31), setting it equal to zero and solving for s2 we get 
 
2 2
1 1
2
2 4 9
2
u s u s
s
  
 . 
So there are two components to the solution set, one at and above the “plus” curve and one at and below the “minus” 
curve. 
 
 Claim:  There are solutions to the inequalities only if u and v are both positive.  (This is reminiscent to the 
a – c >0 condition of section 3.) 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – November 2007 Volume 6, Number 11 
 12 
 If u and v are both negative, then there are patently no solutions to (33) and (34).  If u > 0 and v < 0, then 
the following considerations show that (31) has no solution.  (Similarly if u < 0 and v > 0, then (32) has no 
solutions.) 
 
 For a solution in the upper component of (31) we would have 
 
2 2
1 1 1
2
2 4 9 2 2 2 / 2 2 7
2 2 2 4
u s u s u s u u u u
s u
      
    .    (35) 
 
So there are no solutions there.  For solutions in the lower component we would have 
 
2 2
1 1 1
2 1
2 4 9 2 2
/ 2.
2 2
u s u s u s u
s s
    
    (36) 
 
But in this situation (33) and (34) imply that s1 < 0 and s2 > 0, a contradiction.  So the lower component also has no 
solutions.  This establishes the claim. 
 
 Now to prove that the only solutions are for s1 ≤ 0 and s2 ≤ 0 we argue in a similar way, assuming that both 
u and v are positive. 
 
 Inequality (35) still shows that the upper component of (31) has no solutions.  Similarly the right 
component of (32) has no solutions.  So we need to only consider the lower (right) components of (31) and (32).  
For this inequality (36) shows that the solutions to (31) must satisfy s2 ≤ s1/2.  The similar inequality for (32) shows 
that s1≤ s2/2.  The only simultaneous solutions to these are for s1 ≤ 0 and s2 ≤ 0. 
 
 The results of Proposition 4 state that even with differences in geographical location to market an export 
tax will lead to Pareto improvement in social benefit in a dynamic setting.  Thus, given our model we can conclude 
that an export tax will under all circumstances provide a Pareto improvement relative to free trade.  Furthermore, 
since the payoffs are within the governments FIRS there must exist some δ such that these Pareto improving payoffs 
would be subgame perfect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a dynamic setting there are infinitely many potential subgame perfect outcomes.  In the infinitely 
repeated intraindustry trade policy game free trade is a logical focal point.  However, we have shown that active 
policy, in the form of an export tax, will lead to a Pareto improving payoff, relative to free trade, for both 
governments.  This result is fairly robust with respect to changes in cost.  It was shown that even when per unit costs 
are not equal across firms export taxes will still lead to Pareto improvements relative to free trade. 
 
 When choosing trade policy a dynamic setting may be preferred to a static setting.  An obvious reason for a 
dynamic setting to be preferred is the trade relation itself.  Like the dynamic model current trade relations are 
enforced through a punishment phase.  Punishment is used to deter deviation from negotiated and established policy.  
Dynamic policy will also eliminate the prisoners’ dilemma outcome of the static game.  This characteristic of a 
dynamic model gives the governments more control over their own payoff. 
 
 Allowing trade to occur between the two producing countries, which would make consumption occur in the 
producing countries, would be an interesting extension of the present research.  By including consumers in the 
model a natural boundary on the size of a government’s policy instrument may appear.  It seems reasonable that this 
boundary be chosen endogenously. 
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 An interesting question is what kind of discount factor is needed to establish an export tax as a subgame 
perfect equilibrium?  We have shown that governments can improve upon free trade payoffs using export taxes.  
However, are these governments patient enough to make an export tax a feasible policy? 
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